Super-additive cooperation.

Repeated interactions provide an evolutionary explanation for one-shot human cooperation that is counterintuitive but orthodox1-3. Intergroup competition4-7 provides an explanation that is intuitive but heterodox. Here, using models and a behavioural experiment, we show that neither mechanism reliably supports cooperation. Ambiguous reciprocity, a class of strategies that is generally ignored in models of reciprocal altruism, undermines cooperation under repeated interactions. This finding challenges repeated interactions as an evolutionary explanation for cooperation in general, which further challenges the claim that repeated interactions in the past can explain one-shot cooperation in the present. Intergroup competitions also do not reliably support cooperation because groups quickly become extremely similar, which limits scope for group selection. Moreover, even if groups vary, group competitions may generate little group selection for multiple reasons. Cooperative groups, for example, may tend to compete against each other8. Whereas repeated interactions and group competitions do not support cooperation by themselves, combining them triggers powerful synergies because group competitions constrain the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus suggest neither an evolutionary history of repeated interactions without group competition nor a history of group competition without repeated interactions. Instead, our results suggest social motives that evolved under the joint influence of both mechanisms.

Intra-individual variability in task performance after cognitive training is associated with long-term outcomes in children.

The potential benefits and mechanistic effects of working memory training (WMT) in children are the subject of much research and debate. We show that after five weeks of school-based, adaptive WMT 6-9 year-old primary school children had greater activity in prefrontal and striatal brain regions, higher task accuracy, and reduced intra-individual variability in response times compared to controls. Using a sequential sampling decision model, we demonstrate that this reduction in intra-individual variability can be explained by changes to the evidence accumulation rates and thresholds. Critically, intra-individual variability is useful in quantifying the immediate impact of cognitive training interventions, being a better predictor of academic skills and well-being 6-12 months after the end of training than task accuracy. Taken together, our results suggest that attention control is the initial mechanism that leads to the long-run benefits from adaptive WMT. Selective and sustained attention abilities may serve as a scaffold for subsequent changes in higher cognitive processes, academic skills, and general well-being. Furthermore, these results highlight that the selection of outcome measures and the timing of the assessments play a crucial role in detecting training efficacy. Thus, evaluating intra-individual variability, during or directly after training could allow for the early tailoring of training interventions in terms of duration or content to maximise their impact.

Teaching self-regulation.

Children's self-regulation abilities are key predictors of educational success and other life outcomes such as income and health. However, self-regulation is not a school subject, and knowledge about how to generate lasting improvements in self-regulation and academic achievements with easily scalable, low-cost interventions is still limited. Here we report the results of a randomized controlled field study that integrates a short self-regulation teaching unit based on the concept of mental contrasting with implementation intentions into the school curriculum of first graders. We demonstrate that the treatment increases children's skills in terms of impulse control and self-regulation while also generating lasting improvements in academic skills such as reading and monitoring careless mistakes. Moreover, it has a substantial effect on children's long-term school career by increasing the likelihood of enroling in an advanced secondary school track three years later. Thus, self-regulation teaching can be integrated into the regular school curriculum at low cost, is easily scalable, and can substantially improve important abilities and children's educational career path.

Preferences predict who commits crime among young men.

Understanding who commits crime and why is a key topic in social science and important for the design of crime prevention policy. In theory, people who commit crime face different social and economic incentives for criminal activity than other people, or they evaluate the costs and benefits of crime differently because they have different preferences. Empirical evidence on the role of preferences is scarce. Theoretically, risk-tolerant, impatient, and self-interested people are more prone to commit crime than risk-averse, patient, and altruistic people. We test these predictions with a unique combination of data where we use incentivized experiments to elicit the preferences of young men and link these experimental data to their criminal records. In addition, our data allow us to control extensively for other characteristics such as cognitive skills, socioeconomic background, and self-control problems. We find that preferences are strongly associated with actual criminal behavior. Impatience and, in particular, risk tolerance are still strong predictors when we include the full battery of controls. Crime propensities are 8 to 10 percentage points higher for the most risk-tolerant individuals compared to the most risk averse. This effect is half the size of the effect of cognitive skills, which is known to be a very strong predictor of criminal behavior. Looking into different types of crime, we find that preferences significantly predict property offenses, while self-control problems significantly predict violent, drug, and sexual offenses.

A causal role for the right frontal eye fields in value comparison.

Recent studies have suggested close functional links between overt visual attention and decision making. This suggests that the corresponding mechanisms may interface in brain regions known to be crucial for guiding visual attention - such as the frontal eye field (FEF). Here, we combined brain stimulation, eye tracking, and computational approaches to explore this possibility. We show that inhibitory transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the right FEF has a causal impact on decision making, reducing the effect of gaze dwell time on choice while also increasing reaction times. We computationally characterize this putative mechanism by using the attentional drift diffusion model (aDDM), which reveals that FEF inhibition reduces the relative discounting of the non-fixated option in the comparison process. Our findings establish an important causal role of the right FEF in choice, elucidate the underlying mechanism, and provide support for one of the key causal hypotheses associated with the aDDM.

Testing models at the neural level reveals how the brain computes subjective value.

Decisions are based on the subjective values of choice options. However, subjective value is a theoretical construct and not directly observable. Strikingly, distinct theoretical models competing to explain how subjective values are assigned to choice options often make very similar behavioral predictions, which poses a major difficulty for establishing a mechanistic, biologically plausible explanation of decision-making based on behavior alone. Here, we demonstrate that model comparison at the neural level provides insights into model implementation during subjective value computation even though the distinct models parametrically identify common brain regions as computing subjective value. We show that frontal cortical regions implement a model based on the statistical distributions of available rewards, whereas intraparietal cortex and striatum compute subjective value signals according to a model based on distortions in the representations of probabilities. Thus, better mechanistic understanding of how cognitive processes are implemented arises from model comparisons at the neural level, over and above the traditional approach of comparing models at the behavioral level alone.

A registered replication study on oxytocin and trust.

In an influential paper, Kosfeld et al. (2005) showed that intranasal administration of oxytocin (OT) increases the transfers made by investors in the trust game-suggesting that OT increases trust in strangers. Subsequent studies investigating the role of OT in the trust game found inconclusive effects on the trusting behaviour of investors but these studies deviated from the Kosfeld et al. study in an important way-they did not implement minimal social contact (MSC) between the investors and the trustees in the trust game. Here, we performed a large double-blind and placebo-controlled replication study of the effects of OT on trusting behaviour that yields a power of more than 95% and implements an MSC condition as well as a no-social-contact (NoC) condition. We find no effect of OT on trusting behaviour in the MSC condition. Exploratory post hoc analyses suggest that OT may increase trust in individuals with a low disposition to trust in the NoC condition, but this finding requires confirmation in future research. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 19 October 2018. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.11980368.

Motivated misremembering of selfish decisions.

People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. How do individuals resolve this tension? One way to both pursue personal gain and preserve a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one's selfishness. Here, we test this possibility. Across five experiments (N = 3190), we find that people tend to recall being more generous in the past than they actually were, even when they are incentivized to recall their decisions accurately. Crucially, this motivated misremembering effect occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are. Moreover, this effect disappears under conditions where people no longer perceive themselves as responsible for their fairness violations. Together, these findings suggest that when people's actions fall short of their personal standards, they may misremember the extent of their selfishness, thereby potentially warding off threats to their moral self-image.

Activation of D1 receptors affects human reactivity and flexibility to valued cues.

Reward-predicting cues motivate goal-directed behavior, but in unstable environments humans must also be able to flexibly update cue-reward associations. While the capacity of reward cues to trigger motivation ('reactivity') as well as flexibility in cue-reward associations have been linked to the neurotransmitter dopamine in humans, the specific contribution of the dopamine D1 receptor family to these behaviors remained elusive. To fill this gap, we conducted a randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind pharmacological study testing the impact of three different doses of a novel D1 agonist (relative to placebo) on reactivity to reward-predicting cues (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer) and flexibility of cue-outcome associations (reversal learning). We observed that the impact of the D1 agonist crucially depended on baseline working memory functioning, which has been identified as a proxy for baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. Specifically, increasing D1 receptor stimulation strengthened Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer in individuals with high baseline working memory capacity. In contrast, higher doses of the D1 agonist improved reversal learning only in individuals with low baseline working memory functioning. Our findings suggest a crucial and baseline-dependent role of D1 receptor activation in controlling both cue reactivity and the flexibility of cue-reward associations.

The evolution of distorted beliefs vs. mistaken choices under asymmetric error costs.

Why do people sometimes hold unjustified beliefs and make harmful choices? Three hypotheses include (a) contemporary incentives in which some errors cost more than others, (b) cognitive biases evolved to manage ancestral incentives with variation in error costs and (c) social learning based on choice frequencies. With both modelling and a behavioural experiment, we examined all three mechanisms. The model and experiment support the conclusion that contemporary cost asymmetries affect choices by increasing the rate of cheap errors to reduce the rate of expensive errors. Our model shows that a cognitive bias can distort the evolution of beliefs and in turn behaviour. Unless the bias is strong, however, beliefs often evolve in the correct direction. This suggests limitations on how cognitive biases shape choices, which further indicates that detecting the behavioural consequences of biased cognition may sometimes be challenging. Our experiment used a prime intended to activate a bias called 'hyperactive agency detection', and the prime had no detectable effect on choices. Finally, both the model and experiment show that frequency-dependent social learning can generate choice dynamics in which some populations converge on widespread errors, but this outcome hinges on the other two mechanisms being neutral with respect to choice.

Dopaminergic D1 Receptor Stimulation Affects Effort and Risk Preferences.

BACKGROUND: Activation of D1 receptors has been related to successful goal-directed behavior, but it remains unclear whether D1 receptor activation causally tips the balance of weighing costs and benefits in humans. Here, we tested the impact of pharmacologically stimulated D1 receptors on sensitivity to risk, delay, and effort costs in economic choice and investigated whether D1 receptor stimulation would bias preferences toward options with increased costs in a cost-specific manner. METHODS: In a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group phase 1 study, 120 healthy young volunteers received either placebo or 1 of 3 doses (6 mg, 15 mg, or 30 mg) of a novel, selective D1 agonist (PF-06412562). After drug administration, participants performed decision tasks measuring their preferences for risky, delayed, and effortful outcomes. RESULTS: Higher doses of the D1 agonist increased the willingness to exert physical effort for reward as well as reduced the preference for risky outcomes. We observed no effects on preferences for delayed rewards. CONCLUSIONS: The current results provide evidence that D1 receptor stimulation causally affects core aspects of cost-benefit decision making in humans.

The promise and the peril of using social influence to reverse harmful traditions.

For a policy-maker promoting the end of a harmful tradition, conformist social influence is a compelling mechanism. If an intervention convinces enough people to abandon the tradition, this can spill over and induce others to follow. A key objective is thus to activate such spillovers and amplify an intervention's effects. With female genital cutting as a motivating example, we develop empirically informed analytical and simulation models to examine this idea. Even if conformity pervades decision-making, spillovers can range from irrelevant to indispensable. Our analysis highlights three considerations. First, ordinary forms of individual heterogeneity can severely limit spillovers, and understanding the heterogeneity in a population is essential. Second, although interventions often target samples of the population biased towards ending the harmful tradition, targeting a representative sample is a more robust way to achieve spillovers. Finally, if the harmful tradition contributes to group identity, the success of spillovers can depend critically on disrupting the link between identity and tradition.

The neural circuitry of affect-induced distortions of trust.

Aversive affect is likely a key source of irrational human decision-making, but still, little is known about the neural circuitry underlying emotion-cognition interactions during social behavior. We induced incidental aversive affect via prolonged periods of threat of shock, while 41 healthy participants made investment decisions concerning another person or a lottery. Negative affect reduced trust, suppressed trust-specific activity in the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and reduced functional connectivity between the TPJ and emotion-related regions such as the amygdala. The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) seems to play a key role in mediating the impact of affect on behavior: Functional connectivity of this brain area with left TPJ was associated with trust in the absence of negative affect, but aversive affect disrupted this association between TPJ-pSTS connectivity and behavioral trust. Our findings may be useful for a better understanding of the neural circuitry of affective distortions in healthy and pathological populations.

Computational and neurobiological foundations of leadership decisions.

Leaders must take responsibility for others and thus affect the well-being of individuals, organizations, and nations. We identify the effects of responsibility on leaders' choices at the behavioral and neurobiological levels and document the widespread existence of responsibility aversion, that is, a reduced willingness to make decisions if the welfare of others is at stake. In mechanistic terms, basic preferences toward risk, loss, and ambiguity do not explain responsibility aversion, which, instead, is driven by a second-order cognitive process reflecting an increased demand for certainty about the best choice when others' welfare is affected. Finally, models estimating levels of information flow between brain regions that process separate choice components provide the first step in understanding the neurobiological basis of individual variability in responsibility aversion and leadership scores.

Normative foundations of human cooperation.

A large literature shares the view that social norms shape human cooperation, but without a clean empirical identification of the relevant norms almost every behaviour can be rationalized as norm driven, thus rendering norms useless as an explanatory construct. This raises the question of whether social norms are indeed causal drivers of behaviour and can convincingly explain major cooperation-related regularities. Here, we show that the norm of conditional cooperation provides such an explanation, that powerful methods for its empirical identification exist and that social norms have causal effects. Norm compliance rests on fundamental human motives ('social preferences') that also imply a willingness to punish free-riders, but normative constraints on peer punishment are important for its effectiveness and welfare properties. If given the chance, a large majority of people favour the imposition of such constraints through the migration to institutional environments that enable the normative guidance of cooperation and norm enforcement behaviours.